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The Social Construction of Difference
and the Arab American Experience
LOUISE CAINKAR
INTRODUCTION
THEORIES OF IMMIGRANT integration are a tough fit when it comes
to Arab Americans. Arabs who migrated to the United States in the first
decades of the twentieth century held structural positions and faced barri-
ers of prejudice and discrimination largely similar to those of white ethnics
(especially Italians).1 Although they were barred from a broad range of in-
stitutions run by mainstream whites, they settled in urban and rural areas,
ran businesses, worked in factories, built institutions, flourished artistically,
held government office in a number of places, achieved a degree of eco-
nomic success, and led social lives that were intertwined with members of
white ethnic groups and often resulted in intermarriage. Of course there are
meaningful exceptions to this simplification of history, and in specific lo-
calities, for example, the right of Arabs to naturalize was challenged.2
Nonetheless, the general profile of the Arab experience in the United
States in the early part of the twentieth century displayed more social,
political, and economic incorporation than that of racially excluded African
Americans, Asians, Native Americans, and Latinos. It also was vastly
better than Arab American experiences over the past thirty years, for sub-
stantial evidence indicates a widening social distance between Arab Amer-
icans and all other Americans. This social distance has been created and
reproduced by institutions of power (external to Arab American commu-
nities), is measurable, and is manifested in government policies, main-
stream cultural representations, public perceptions and attitudes, discrim-
inatory behaviors, physical insecurity, and social and political exclusion.
However, there are continuities between Arab communities past and pres-
ent. In both periods and throughout the intervening years, Arabs have
been highly entrepreneurial, heavily engaged in retail trade, and have
posted above average median incomes. Indeed, the first wave of Arab im-
migrants carved out occupational niches and established economic and
employment patterns that continue to characterize today’s Arab Ameri-
can communities. While from one perspective this economic stability may
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signal success, from another it could suggest blocked socio-economic
mobility.
The differences in experience between past and present Arab Ameri-
can generations are due in part to religious factors. The earliest Arab im-
migrants more often were Christian than Muslim, while the reverse is now
the case. But reducing historical changes in the Arab American experience
to a Muslim-Christian dichotomy is not as analytically useful as it may ap-
pear. Currently, all major American Arab organizations, local and national,
are staffed by members of both religious groups and share the same ob-
jectives: reducing discrimination, stereotyping, political exclusion, and eth-
nic vilification. Persons with Arabic-sounding names, whether Christian
or Muslim, report experiencing job discrimination and anti-Arab com-
ments, and persons with the “Arab/Middle Eastern” phenotype have been
physically attacked regardless of religion. It is not clear that the Ameri-
can public has a differentiated view of the Christian versus the Muslim
Arab; the utter simplicity of monolithic, anti-Arab messages has succeeded
in precluding thoughtful distinctions. The negative experiences around
which Arab American organizations have mobilized preceded by decades
the September 11, 2001, attacks but they laid the groundwork for the col-
lective backlash that followed them.
The deterioration in Arab American experiences over time also cannot
be explained by economic factors, either of poverty or downward changes
in the human capital of Arab immigrants, such as Alejandro Portes and
Alex Stepick note with regard to the waves of Cuban immigrants who en-
tered the United States.3 The earliest Arab immigrants were predominantly
uneducated Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian peasants, while since the
1950s Arab immigrants include highly educated Egyptians and Iraqis, pre-
dominantly entrepreneurial Jordanians and Yemenis, and better educated
Lebanese, Syrians, and Palestinians. In 2000, the proportion of Arabs with
high school diplomas and bachelor’s degrees was higher than that of the
total U.S. population, a figure that applies to every Arab nationality group.4
Arab men and women working full-time had higher median incomes in
1999 than did the total U.S. population, a characteristic that applied to all
Arab nationality groups except Moroccans and Iraqi and “Arabic” men.5
At the same time, Arabs had higher poverty rates than did the total U.S.
population (17% versus 12%). This difference, however, is explained largely
by 1990s Iraqi refugees and to a lesser extent by more recent Palestinian
immigrants fleeing continuing deteriorating conditions. While many newer
Arab immigrants have low levels of education and job skills, the overall
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social class background and human capital of Arab immigrants certainly
has not declined over time.
In the course of ethnographic research in metropolitan Chicago in the
1980s, I found that Palestinians who had migrated to the United States
since the 1970s were more intentionally (and overtly) Palestinian than
those who migrated before this time, and that cultivating a Palestinian iden-
tity was a major life theme for second-generation Palestinians born in the
United States in the 1950s and 1960s.6 These Palestinian Americans sought
to reverse their parents’efforts to shed parts of their history as they achieved
economic stability and accommodated to American society. Certainly, the
social movements of the 1960s, the influx of new immigrants fresh from
Palestine, and the expansion of Palestinian community institutions played
a role in this identity formation, but they alone did not provide sufficient
cause to loosen one’s identification with being American. Rather, global
events, the relationship of the U.S. government to them, and accompany-
ing media depictions were more important predictors of the Palestinian
American experience than were the viewpoints and customs of new im-
migrants or post-civil rights American institutional changes, which found
Arabs largely excluded from both mainstream organizations and mobiliza-
tions of people of color. American media portrayals that have persisted
since the 1967 Israeli-Arab War in depicting Palestinians as inherently
savage, and the subsequent institutional silencing of Palestinian American
and Arab American voices (whether Christian or Muslim), are socio-
political projects that have fostered the institutional exclusion of Pales-
tinian and Arab Americans and heightened their sense of otherness. Due
to global events and the political agendas of powerful institutional actors,
the assimilation process, as Richard Alba and Victor Nee recently redefined
it, went into reversal as social distance and group distinctiveness became
more relevant, not less, for Arab American communities.7
These historic achievements, continuities, and reversals of fate highlight
the problem of understanding theoretically the Arab American ethnic ex-
perience over time. Evidencing neither Gans’s theories of straight-line or
bumpy social integration over the passage of decades and advent of new
generations, nor Portes and Min Zhou’s segmented assimilation, nor his-
toric racial exclusion, Arab Americans as a group have experienced a ma-
jor social shift from the margins of the mainstream to its outer boundaries.8
One need only view television and film representations, consult public
opinion polls, or spend time among Arab Americans, who strive to lead
normal lives in the context of ever-present stereotypes and hostile images,
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to establish their current subaltern position. Negative perceptions of Arabs
have been so widely held as to have created measurable harmful impacts on
the character of the Arab American experience. At the same time, Arab
Americans continue to evidence overall economic success. This seeming
incongruity is explained by a combination of factors: the positive economic
experiences of the earliest Arab immigrants, who did not face this type of
social exclusion nor barriers of color, the high human capital of post-1950s
Arab immigrants, the academic achievements of the second generation,
and resources embedded in strong ethnic social networks.9
The Arab American experience does not fit dominant theories about
ethnic integration in the United States because the conditions and vari-
ables these theories take into account were developed in earlier historic
eras and largely concern domestic matters, while the Arab case is tied to
more recent global political developments. Dominant theories do not, for
example, consider that domestic institutional processes emerging from
American global political interests can have long-term impacts on the so-
cial position of ethnic communities. This is perhaps because the negative
experiences of Japanese Americans during World War II or German Amer-
icans during World War I were quite serious but relatively short-lived
(compared to the many more decades-long Arab experience), and the in-
carceration of Japanese Americans came on the heels of decades of racial
exclusion. In other global conflicts, domestic processes have centered on
delegitimizing certain political ideologies (e.g., communism, anarchism,
liberation theology) and establishing the hegemony of others (e.g., capi-
talism). Consequently, their social and policy impacts were largely felt
by political organizations and activists, while the persons living under
the rule of “enemy” ideologies were humanized and offered refuge. But
when over a protracted period of time domestic institutions invoke essen-
tialist constructions of human difference as their primary justifications for
global political action, backed by power to assert their hegemony, their
impact cannot but be felt by the human communities so construed.
The theoretical construction that best captures the Arab American ex-
perience over time is racial formation, as elaborated by Michael Omi and
Howard Winant.10 The structural exclusion of Arab Americans from a
wide range of social institutions has evolved from a plethora of “racial
projects”—in the media, arts, news, pedagogy, academia, civil society, po-
litical organizations, public policy, and popular culture—in which social
constructions of the essential differences of Arabs (and later Muslims)
have been put forth so extensively as to become widely accepted as com-
mon sense, as evidenced in public opinion polls. Winant has argued that
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public policies no longer can be legitimately sold to the public using racial
typologies and stereotypes. Alba and Nee argue that the legitimacy of
“overtly racist beliefs and practice have never been lower in the eyes of
most Americans.”11 I argue that discourses, with socio-political objectives,
that stress essential cultural and civilizational differences are nearly iden-
tical replacements for racist ideas and are alive and well in America.12
Arab Americans have been racialized using dominant discourses about
their inherent violence, which are propped up with confirming images
(such as angry mobs) in a process tied to the rise of the United States as a
superpower and its foreign (not domestic) policy interests. This stigmati-
zation threw Arab American communities off their previous course in
American society as it re-created them as “others,” as people who stand
in opposition to Americanness because of their inherent values and dis-
positions. Arab opposition to Israeli military occupation and dispossession
was constructed as illegitimate through recreating Arabs as not only vio-
lent but also racist and anti-Semitic, another opposition to core American
values. Later media fascinations with the question, “can Arabs be demo-
cratic?” follow in a similar vein, again positing that Arabs by nature hold
values that clash with the essential values of the United States. Wide-
spread American beliefs in the essential social and cultural differences of
Arabs erected social boundaries around Arab Americans not of their own
creation. Arab Americans conduct their lives in the context of negative
representations and discourses, which intensify in parallel to U.S. in-
volvement in the Arab region. With members of the American public they
either must engage in reductionist debates about “Arabs” or keep quiet and
confine their social relationships to persons who see through these om-
nipresent images. Arab American civic and political engagement is fore-
stalled by this problematic situation as well as by institutional barriers
erected under the pretext that their foreign policy perspectives are illegit-
imate and un-American. Limited social contact with persons outside of
their own group further enhances social isolation.13 Institutionally and
socially isolated, their communities were easily held collectively respon-
sible for the 9/11 attacks and then transformed into a threat to the nation.
Before turning to the Arab American experience and the process of con-
structing the Arab other, one final point must be made. In the 1990s, Arab
American communities experienced another major shift when increasing
numbers of immigrant and second-generation Arab Muslims became en-
gaged in religious practice. While not every Arab Muslim underwent this
change, which privileged religiosity over secularism, community-wide
transformations in ethos and practice were dramatic and measurable and
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continue to this day. As with earlier shifts in identity and sense of inclu-
sion in American society, this change was not explainable solely by the in-
fluence of new immigrants, although they gave momentum to it. Islamic
revival was a global process that reached the shores of the United States
through Muslim religious leaders, the Internet, satellite television, and
return visits to the homeland, as well as through new immigrants. Its ap-
peal to Arab Americans lay in its capacity to provide meaning and re-
silience for the Arab American experience, a historic role of religion in
American life.14
In concordance with this global change, essentialized constructions of
violent and backwards Arabs were extended nearly seamlessly to Muslims.
The same representations were deployed, but instead of being about Arab
culture they were about Islam and its “flawed civilization,” as expressed in
the clash of civilizations discourse popularized by Harvard scholar Samuel
Huntington.15 As Arab American Muslims became more religious, their
differences from others in the communities in which they lived became
more pronounced and more real. The evolving paradox, however, is that
Muslims, as a religious group, are able to make stronger claims on Amer-
ican civil and political society than Arabs as a racialized ethnic group.
The social inclusion of new religious groups in American society, resting
on the foundations of freedom of religion, has been much easier to achieve
historically than the social inclusion of negatively racialized groups, de-
spite foundational assertions that “all men are created equal.”
CONSTRUCTING THE ARAB
Arabs have had a unique experience with social construction in America.
In their one hundred plus year history in the United States, their social
status has changed from marginal white to a more subordinate status that
shares many features common to the experiences of people of color. Just as
one can document and measure the process of becoming white,16 a down-
grading of the social status of Arabs in America through processes iden-
tified as racial formation is measurable: in public policies; mainstream
representations; social patterns of discrimination, separation, and exclusion;
and in self-identification. While the early Arab American experience
(1880–1930) was largely similar to that of white ethnics as measured by
residential, employment, and marital patterns as well as land ownership,
voting, and naturalization rights (although there are some localized ex-
ceptions), the Arab American experience since the late 1960s has been
decidedly different. After that moment in time, dominant themes of the
248 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter/Spring 2006
13_Cainkar_8044_JAEH_Trans  5/26/06  9:35 AM  Page 248
Arab American experience have been exclusion, prejudice, discrimination,
stereotyping, and selective policy enforcement, themes evidenced in schol-
arly research on Arabs produced during this period.17 In the late 1970s,
pollsters Seymour Lipset and Martin Schneider found attitudes toward
Arabs “close to racist,” and in the early 1980s Shelly Slade concluded that
“Arabs remain one of the few ethnic groups that can still be slandered
with impunity in America.”18
Indeed, the most important, pan-Arab American organizations founded
since the 1960s—the Association of Arab American University Graduates,
the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), the Arab
American Institute, and the National Association of Arab Americans—had
as their primary organizational objectives the reversal of these conditions
of inequality and the dismantling of the propositions of innate cultural dif-
ference that lay at their root. One of the first historic studies of Arab Amer-
ican communities commissioned by an Arab American organization
(ADC) noted:
At a time when the United States is more receptive to cultural plu-
ralism, and ethnicity is no longer socially unacceptable, Arab
Americans remain primary targets of defamatory attacks on their
cultural and personal character. Thus, much of the activity of the
Arab-American community has been directed at correcting the
stereotypes that threaten to produce a new wave of anti-Arab
racism in the United States and endanger the civil and human
rights of the Arab-American community.19
The racial formation processes experienced by Arab Americans differ in
both historical timing and pretext from that of other groups in the United
States. Historically afforded some of the benefits and protections of white-
ness, as in their eligibility for homestead lands, legal rights, and voting
rights, Arab Americans’ exclusion from social and political perquisites
post-dates the historic exclusions of other negatively racialized groups. It
cannot therefore be perfectly tied, in its genesis, to ideas about race and the
superiority of whiteness that have existed since the founding of the United
States. Rather, the fall of Arabs from the graces of marginal whiteness is
traceable to the emergence of the United States as a global superpower.
This socio-political relationship, although not framed in racial terms, is
acknowledged in some of the earlier scholarship on Arab Americans. For
example, Baha Abu-Laban and Michael Suleiman note that the source
of bias against Arabs in the United States relates “more to the original
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homeland and peoples than to the Arab-American community.”20 In the
1984 ADC report noted above, domestic “images of greedy oil sheiks and
bloodthirsty terrorists” are tied to political and economic events in the
Middle East.21 More to the point, “the source of today’s defamation of Arab
Americans might be described as the domestic counterpart of the Arab-
Israeli conflict.”22
Research on Palestinians in the United States showed how maintain-
ing an American identity was fraught with conflict for Palestinian Ameri-
cans, who were portrayed by the media as a culturally barbaric group,
whose organizations were treated by the U.S. government as the enemy
within, and whose story of dispossession was framed as a public discourse
that was divisive, if not anti-Semitic.23 The questions they were forced to
ask themselves were: can one be American and America’s enemy at the
same time? Can one participate in American civil society while being ex-
cluded from its discourses? The Palestinian case exposed the racialized
nature of the political discourse. Whereas the Soviet, Cuban, and Sandin-
ista enemies were governments and political ideologies, the Arab enemy
was Arabs—men and women imbued with innate cultural dispositions to
violence and hatred.
The domestic transformation of Arabs from a marginal white to struc-
turally subordinate status was facilitated by the flexibility of whiteness
and the historic and “observable” racial liminality of Arabs (a concept that
can be extended to South Asians and Latinos). But, at its core, the social
and political exclusion of Arabs in the United States has been a racial for-
mation process because Arab inferiority has been constructed and sold to
the American public using essentialist constructions of human difference,
resulting in specific forms of structural isolation. In the 1990s, when
Islamist challenges to American global hegemony became more powerful
than Arab nationalism, these constructions were extended more broadly to
Muslims and became grander—they became civilizational. Seen as re-
cently as 1943 by the Immigration and Naturalization Service as persons
who shared “in the development of our civilization,” affirming their white-
ness and justifying their eligibility for naturalization, Arabs and Muslims
were, by the 1990s, positioned by the “clash of civilizations” viewpoint as
the cultural other—a categorization that had become an accepted scholarly
perspective.24 The seemingly race-neutral lens of essentialized cultural
and religious differences became useful after blatant racism had lost its
power as an effective hegemonic tool (an outcome of the civil rights
movement, according to race scholars). Nonetheless, the components of
racialization were there: the assertion of innate characteristics held by
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all members of a group and the use of power to reward, control, and pun-
ish based on these determinations.
Since race remains one of the fundamental tools for claiming rewards
and organizing discipline in American society—and is something Ameri-
cans know and understand—these notions of essential human difference
have been corporealized, as if they were about color. Thus, race became
the operant reference category for a woman voicing opposition to the con-
struction of a mosque in her suburb, when she testified in 2004: “I have
no ill remorse for the Muslim race at all. I wish we could all live in peace,
but. . . .”25 The corporealization is also evident in the actionable but sloppy
phenotypic category “Arabs, Muslims, and persons assumed to be Arabs
and Muslims,” terms without which no analyst can accurately describe
the victims of hate crimes and verbal assault in the United States after the
9/11 attacks. The phenotype became lethal when, one week after terror
attacks on London’s public transportation, an undocumented Brazilian im-
migrant was shot dead by London police for wearing a backpack, running
into the subway, and “looking Middle Eastern.” Similarly, in August 2005
some New York legislators called for baggage checks of persons entering
New York subways who fit the “Middle Eastern” profile.26
Because the racialization of Arabs is tied to larger American global
policies, the domestic aspect of this project is in the manufacture of pub-
lic consent needed to support, finance, and defend these policies. For this
reason, the most noted features of Arab exclusion in the United States are
tactical: persistent, negative media representations, denial of political
voice, governmental and non-governmental policies targeting their ac-
tivism, and distortions of Arab and Muslim values, ways of life, and
homelands (civilizational distortions). All of these actions are tied to the
delegitimation of Arab claims and disenfranchisement of dissenting voices
in order to assert an informational hegemony. Arab Americans have main-
tained their economic successes despite the context of political and so-
cial exclusion, in part because they tend to work as professionals and en-
trepreneurs, in occupations that are largely peripheral to power and the
corporate mainstream.27
Since the darkening of Arabs began in earnest after the beneficiaries of
the U.S. civil rights movement had been determined and the categories of
“non-white” and “minority” had been set, Arabs have experienced the dou-
ble burden of being excluded from the full scope of whiteness and from
mainstream recognition as people of color. They are therefore still offi-
cially white and ineligible for affirmative action.28 As Saliba notes, while
Arab Americans have been victims of racist policies, their experiences
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have been rendered invisible by dominant discourses about race.29 Their
exclusion has been evident in political mobilizations and in multicultural
pedagogy. Political exclusion of Arab voices in mainstream civil society
has been reinforced by issue-control, through which organizational leaders
silence discussion of issues that challenge U.S. policies in the Arab world
(e.g., Palestine, Iraq) when assertion of them may frustrate other organi-
zational objectives. In pedagogy, Arabs have been excluded from race and
ethnic studies and, when mentioned, are often treated differently from
other groups.30 Consider the following quote from a race and ethnic stud-
ies textbook, which implies that, unlike other groups, Arabs are respon-
sible for their own stereotyping:
Perhaps more serious [than discrimination faced by Muslim
women] is the persistence of negative stereotyping that has
plagued Middle Easterners in the United States. The activities of
Arab terrorists in the Middle East and elsewhere have created
a sinister image of Arab and other Middle Eastern groups—an
image that was greatly exacerbated by the attack on the World
Trade Center in 200131 [emphasis added].
The exclusion of Arab Americans and their organizations from main-
stream vehicles of dissent also left them with few powerful allies from
the 1960s onward (although they have had some measurable local suc-
cesses), allowing their challenges to hostile media representations, text-
book biases, and selective policy enforcement to be ignored without
repercussions.32 As they stood virtually alone, discrimination and the pro-
duction of negative images flourished, pointing to the importance of the
organizations of civil society for halting racist activities and to the vic-
tory of strategies that ensured Arab exclusion from these groups.33 Con-
sequently, perpetuation and reinforcement of stigmatized views as well
as political isolation left Arabs as open targets for collective punishment
after the 9/11 attacks on the United States.
Because the formation of Arabs as a unique “racial” group (separate
from whites as well as others) was a process with timing and purpose dif-
ferent from historic American racism, its objective manifestation also dif-
fers from that of traditionally subordinated groups: African Americans,
Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans. Its impact is not well measured by
indices of income, occupation, education, and segregation, because their
racialization intervened in the ongoing trajectories of historically suc-
cessful Arab American communities, and because a large percentage of
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post-World War II Arab immigrants came to the United States with sig-
nificant amounts of human capital. These facts have allowed Arabs to
overcome some of the economic outcomes that usually correlate with sub-
ordinate status; at the same time, they mask the deep impact such subor-
dinate status has on Arab communities with low levels of human capi-
tal.34 For similar historic reasons, some Arabs may see themselves as
white (especially if they have benefited or seek to benefit from historical
whiteness) while others may not, and Arab American communities may
vary in their political alliances and understandings around race. Because
of these unusual variations, Arab Americans may have racial options—
a modification of Waters’s concept of ethnic options—that members of
other groups do not possess.35 Nevertheless, these options do not alter
their grounded realities as a negatively stigmatized group.36 For these rea-
sons of experience and aspiration, a person’s racial identity may change
over the course of his or her lifetime. For Arab Americans, racialization
and racial identity formation should be seen as unfolding and ongoing
processes.
The ways in which Arabs, Muslims, and persons assumed to be Arabs
and Muslims were held collectively responsible for the 9/11 attacks
(demonstrated below) should alone provide convincing evidence that their
racial denouement had been sufficiently sealed before the attacks oc-
curred.37 The public attribution of collective responsibility for the attacks
required an a priori understanding that Arabs and Muslims should be seen
as monolithic. This perspective is reserved for persons from cultures rep-
resented as backwards or barbaric, where it is assumed that individuals op-
erate in mechanical solidarity “in so far as they have no action of their
own, as with the molecules of inorganic bodies. . . . In societies where
this type of solidarity is highly developed, the individual is not his own
master.”38 Allegations of primitive culture and mechanical solidarity cor-
respond to Western racism as they have been used historically to describe
communities of color. Groups described as inherently violent and un-
assimilable have been held responsible for their own negative fates, not
the structures that denied them rights. They have been portrayed as ob-
stacles to the progress of manifest destiny and as the white man’s burden.
In contrast, a primary correlate of whiteness is the attribution of moder-
nity, rationality, and individuality, including individual culpability. When
someone who is white commits an act interpreted as wrong or reprehen-
sible, it is depicted by the organs of power as an individual act, one that
has no reflection on the values and beliefs of other members of the white
population. At the same time, paradoxically, the positive virtues of white-
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ness are represented as shared characteristics. Thus, during World War II,
Japanese Americans were interned as potential enemies, but neither Ger-
man Americans nor Italian Americans were so treated. The media spoke of
Hitler, Mussolini, and “the Japs.”39 Hitler and Mussolini’s forces were
portrayed as deviants and outliers, not reflections on white, European, or
Christian culture. But the violent act of any Arab or Muslim is rendered
to represent entire societies and cultures, portrayed as a mechanical, civi-
lizational act. As with the Japanese in the United States during World War
Two, these racialized ways of thinking require a priori stigmatization and
cultural constructions.
Widespread use of the “clash of civilizations” thesis by scholars, film-
makers, publishers, the media, the Christian right, and certain members of
the U.S. government—actions similar to what Omi and Winant call racial
projects—cemented the social isolation of Arabs and Muslims before
9/11 and established the pre-conditions for collective backlash after the at-
tacks. Since the backlash has been perpetrated largely by whites, it can
be seen as a project further defining the boundaries of whiteness.40 Re-
search conducted in metropolitan Chicago shows that those who perpe-
trated these acts were often simultaneously displaying American flags,
suggesting symbolic attempts to define the boundaries of the American
nation and who lies outside of them. While there is no doubt that concerns
about personal safety and national security were behind some of the back-
lash (as well as behind some government policies that followed the 9/11
attacks), it is in their unbridled collective nature, their inclination to tar-
get persons who looked like group members, that shows their racialized
character. Members of groups that have been “othered” experience col-
lective discipline and punishment, irrespective of any individual’s rela-
tionship to a particular event, activity, or location.
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 9/11 ATTACKS
AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES THEREAFTER
Analysis of public policies and data collected in an ethnographic study
of the impact of 9/11 on Arabs and Muslims in the Chicago metro area
amply demonstrate the imposition of collective responsibility for the at-
tacks on Arab and Muslim American communities, irrespective of the
fact that members of them did not plan or perpetrate them.41 Arabs and
Muslims in the US have experienced, and continue to experience, forms of
collective punishment as their looks and names mark them as targets.
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Without much public discussion or debate, the United States govern-
ment implemented a range of domestic policies in the name of national
security and the war on terrorism after the attacks of September 11.
Twenty-five of the thirty-seven known government security initiatives im-
plemented between the September 12, 2001, and mid-2003 either explic-
itly or implicitly targeted U.S. Arabs and Muslims.42 These measures in-
cluded mass arrests, secret and indefinite detentions, prolonged detention
of “material witnesses,” closed hearings, secret evidence, government
eavesdropping on attorney/client conversations, FBI interviews, wire-
tapping, seizures of property, removals of aliens with technical visa vio-
lations, and mandatory special registration. At the very minimum, at least
100,000 Arabs and Muslims living in the United States personally expe-
rienced one of these measures.43 Furthermore, the number of Arabs and
Muslims able to study, work, or attend trainings, meetings, and confer-
ences in the United States has plummeted.44 The profiling of Arabs and
Muslims at U.S. airports via special security checks and removal from air-
planes has dampened their desire to travel domestically or abroad. In a
February 2002 article entitled “Flying While Arab,” Arab-American Busi-
ness magazine provided special safety tips for Arab-American travelers.
While many Arabs say these selective airport procedures have ended, oth-
ers remain reticent to fly.45
Government measures began directly after the September 11 attacks
with the round-up and detention of some 1,200 citizens and non-citizens,
most of Arab and South Asian descent. Although the U.S. government
has never released identities, profiling based on looks, names, and being in
the wrong place at the wrong time characterizes the contexts in which
many were arrested and detained. More than five hundred of these de-
tainees were deported for visa violations, after long waits under incarcer-
ation for security clearance; none were charged with connections to ter-
rorism.46 Subsequent measures included both mandatory holds on all
non-immigrant visa applications submitted by men aged 18 to 45 from
twenty-six countries (most of them Arab, subject to special security clear-
ances) and interviews with some five thousand individuals who came to
the United States from Arab and Muslim countries after January 1, 2000,
on non-immigrant visas, plus a second round of interviews with an addi-
tional three thousand persons. The Justice Department asked local police
departments to participate in interviewing Arab residents of their towns,
placing them in the position of monitoring persons they are supposed to
protect.
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In January 2002, the INS (now split between two divisions of the De-
partment of Homeland Security) launched an initiative to track down and
deport six thousand non-citizen males from (unnamed) “Middle Eastern”
countries who had been ordered deported but never left the country. Even
though they are less than two percent of the estimated 314,000 so-called
“absconders” in the United States, “Middle Easterners” were the govern-
ment’s target. In a meeting with members of Chicago’s Arab community,
government officials claimed that they were not engaging in racial profil-
ing, since other communities would be approached next, although they
never were.47 In June 2002, the Department of Justice issued an internal
memo to the INS and U.S. Customs requesting that they seek out and
search all Yemenis entering the country, including American citizens.
Yemeni Americans were removed from planes and boarding lines, waiting
hours for security clearances. In July 2002, the INS announced that it
would begin enforcing section 265(a) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, which requires all aliens to register changes-of-address within ten
days of moving. Nothing prevents the selective enforcement of this rule
and, indeed, an INS official from one region openly stated that this rule
was not intended to be enforced for everyone.48 In North Carolina, a Pales-
tinian legal immigrant stopped for driving four miles over the speed limit
was detained for two months and finally charged with a misdemeanor for
failing to report his address change. The INS sought his deportation, but
a local immigration judge ruled that the defendant could not be deported
because he did not willfully break the law.
On August 12, 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft announced the imple-
mentation of the Special Registration program, requiring tens of thou-
sands of foreign visitors from Arab and Muslim countries to be finger-
printed, photographed, and registered. The domestic call-in part of the
program required non-immigrant49 males, aged 16 to 64, from twenty-
three Muslim-majority countries, plus heavily Muslim Eritrea (and North
Korea), to report and register with the U.S. immigration authorities during
a specified time frame in order to be fingerprinted, photographed, and
questioned. They were expected thereafter to submit to routine reporting.
Credit cards, licenses, and other documents were photocopied and some-
times not returned. Registrants were checked against lists for terrorist con-
nections. Persons cleared of terrorist connections but found to be in vio-
lation of their visas or out of (immigration) status were jailed, required to
post bond, and issued removal (deportation) orders.50
“THIS NOTICE IS FOR YOU” was splayed across the top of INS fly-
ers announcing the registration call-in program, reminiscent of the notices
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posted for Japanese living in Pacific Coast states during World War Two.
The arrest and detention in southern California of hundreds of registrants,
mostly Iranians, during the first period of registration sparked a national
protest, as persons seeking to voluntarily comply with government rules
were handcuffed and led off to jail for visa violations. Men in leg shackles
were confined to rooms holding fifty or more persons and forced to sleep
on concrete floors. Most of these detainees were working taxpayers with
families who had otherwise lived lawfully in the United States for decades
and many had pending applications for permanent residency.51
In May 2003, the government phased out domestic call-in registra-
tion. According to the Department of Homeland Security, 82,880 Arabs,
Muslims, and others from the selected countries had been “specially”
registered through domestic call-in. Of these, 13,434 were issued removal
orders for visa violations, all of them affirmatively cleared of terrorism
or terrorist connections. Another 127,694 persons were registered at their
port-of-entry and none were found to have connections to terrorists.52
Of the more than 200,000 Muslims, Arabs, and persons from Muslim-
majority countries registered, less than fifty were found to have criminal
records. The rounding up for removal of more than 14,000 persons for visa
violations—a highly select group comprising less than one percent of the
estimated 3.2–3.6 million persons living in the country while “out of sta-
tus” and the eight million undocumented—has few historic precedents in
the United States, far outnumbering the 556 foreign nationals deported for
their political beliefs during the infamous 1919 Palmer Raids.53
The purpose of the special registration, according to the Executive As-
sociate Commissioner of the INS Office of Field Operations, was to fa-
cilitate the “monitoring” of aliens whose residence in the United States
warranted it “in the interest of national security.”54 The Department of
Homeland Security, which took over the now-divided immigration (and
naturalization) functions of the former INS, referred to Special Registra-
tion (using its NSEERS acronym) as a “pilot project focusing on a smaller
segment of the nonimmigrant alien population deemed to be of risk to
national security.”55 These statements make explicit the government’s
view that Arabs and Muslims as a group are considered a security risk
for the United States. This view is found in other Bush Administration
programs, such as FBI director Mueller’s January 2003 initiative to tie FBI
field office goals for wire-tapping and undercover activities to the num-
ber of mosques in the field area.56
An examination of the legislative history upon which Attorney General
Ashcroft legitimated special registration provides useful clues about its
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ideological and racial boundary-making. Ashcroft cited legislative au-
thority for this program encompassing a history going back to the 1798
Alien and Sedition Acts, which were primarily aimed at restraining and
deporting aliens living in the United States who were considered subver-
sive. Ashcroft specifically cited as his authority the 1940 Smith Act, for-
mally known as the 1940 Alien Registration Act, which was passed to
strengthen national defense in response to fears of communist and anar-
chist influences in the United States. It required that all aliens over the age
of thirteen be fingerprinted and registered, and required parents and legal
guardians to register those thirteen years of age and younger. In turn, they
received a numbered Alien Registration Receipt Card from the DOJ/INS
proving registry and were required to carry this card with them at all
times.57 The Smith Act was built on 1918 legislation making past and pres-
ent membership in “proscribed organizations and subversive classes”
grounds for exclusion and deportation. The 1918 Act, in turn, was built
on the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. The Smith Act was aimed not only
at foreigners. It also prohibited American citizens from advocating or be-
longing to groups that advocated or taught the “duty, necessity desirabil-
ity, or propriety” of overthrowing any level of government by “force or
violence.” It was the first peacetime federal sedition law since 1798 and
was the basis of later prosecutions of persons alleged to be members of
communist and socialist parties. The 2002 special registration program
thus lies within the family of policies permitting the government to mon-
itor, restrain, and remove persons whose political beliefs and ideologies
it perceives as a threat.
On the other hand, because the special registration program named its
targets by their country of birth, not their political beliefs, it shares fea-
tures of the body of U.S. policies based on ideas about race, including
slavery, abolished in 1865, and Indian removal. Other such initiatives in-
cluded the 1790 Naturalization Law, denying naturalized citizenship to
non-whites, the last remnants of which were repealed in 1952; the 1882
Chinese Exclusion Act, repealed in 1943; the Asiatic Barred Zone; and the
immigration quotas (enacted in 1921 and revised in 1924, 1929, and 1952,
whose abolition in 1965 signaled the end of an era in which U.S. immi-
gration policies were based principally on race). Although most of these
laws referred to geographies and countries, their explicit purpose was
racial. After 1965, it was considered against liberal democratic principles
to blatantly discriminate in immigration policies by country of birth. But,
in 1981 the regulation of persons from select “foreign states” re-emerged
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in immigration law when the Attorney General was permitted to require
“natives of any one or more foreign states, or any class of group thereof”
to provide the government with address and other information upon ten-
days notice.58 Interestingly, the Iran Crisis of 1980 was specifically men-
tioned in the House Judiciary Committee report submitted for the 1981
law, thus connecting new geographically-based immigration policies to
political Islam.59 Attorney General Ashcroft used the 1981 law to autho-
rize call-in special registration.60 Selective policies by country of birth
emerged again in 1991 when Attorney General Richard Thornburgh re-
quired the special registration of persons holding Iraqi and Kuwaiti pass-
ports and travel documents.61
In sum, since the end of quotas and the dawn of the civil rights era, puni-
tive or controlling special immigration policies based on country of birth
or nationality have been applied solely to persons from (non-European)
Muslim-majority countries (with the exception of North Korea) and to
Arabs. These place-based discriminatory policies flourish at the nexus of
assumptions about the relationship between national origin and presumed
inherent cultural and ideological traits—what we have come to label as
“race.” These laws and policies locate Arabs and Muslims and place them
in a subordinate status, thereby reinforcing the appropriateness of main-
taining essentialist ideas about members of these groups.
These post-9/11 policies and programs link back to the racialization of
Arabs and Muslims because of the essentialized, undifferentiated repre-
sentations of these groups. Those representations, based on the assump-
tion that persons who inhabit the grand categories of Arab and Muslim
possess certain innate characteristics making them a security risk, were
institutionalized through homeland security and war-on-terror policies.
Operating in tandem with Islamaphobic discourses found in American
society, these policies entrench the stigmatization of Arabs and Muslims
in the United States. Understanding that race is a historically located so-
cial construct that has no fixed meaning and that it differentiates between
human beings using discourses of human essences, we must ask: can poli-
cies that target persons from two continents, three geographic regions, and
through their messiness incorporate persons from three major religions, be
considered part of a racial project?62 The answer, I believe, is yes, because
they use essentialized categories and understandings to create structural
outcomes, which in turn become tied in the public’s mind to a phenotype.
Thus, a global project that included multiple subordinate populations has
been amalgamated into a civilizational racial project.
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POPULAR SUPPORT FOR COLLECTIVE POLICIES
After the 9/11 attacks, public opinion polls showed broad support for the
special treatment of Arabs and Muslims as groups in the United States. A
poll conducted in mid-September 2001 found respondents evenly divided
over whether all Arabs in the United States, including American citizens,
should be required to carry special identity cards.63 Two late-September
Gallup polls found that a majority of Americans favored profiling of
Arabs, including American citizens, and subjecting them to special secu-
rity checks before boarding planes.64 A December 2001 University of Illi-
nois poll found that some 70 percent of Illinois residents were willing to
sacrifice their civil rights to fight terrorism, and more than one-quarter of
respondents said Arab Americans should surrender more rights than
others.65 A March 2002 CNN/Gallup/USA Today poll found that nearly
60 percent of Americans favored reducing the number of immigrants from
Muslim countries. Five months later, a majority of the American public
polled said that there were “too many” immigrants from Arab countries.66
In December 2004, a Cornell University study found that nearly 50 per-
cent of respondents in a national poll believed the U.S. government should
curtail civil liberties for Muslim Americans.67
These polls indicate that the essentialized representations of Arabs and
Muslims—propagated by the media and film industry, uncontested in ped-
agogy, and reflected in government policies and actions—have been ex-
tremely effective in garnering public support for treating Arabs and Mus-
lims as a distinct group (often reified in the artificial concept of “Middle
Easterners”) possessing fewer rights than others. These views would not
have emerged so quickly after 9/11 had they not been cultivated prior to
the attacks. Otherwise, the hijackers would have been seen in ways simi-
lar to Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber, or members of the
Irish Republican Army—as extremists whose actions do not reflect on an
entire race, religion, or civilization.
ARABS AND RACE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ARAB
MUSLIMS IN METROPOLITAN CHICAGO
Data from interviews conducted between 2002 and 2004 with Arab Mus-
lims in metropolitan Chicago as part of a post 9/11 ethnographic study pro-
vide insight into how Arabs view their place in the racial structure of the
United States. One hundred and two study participants (see Table 1 for
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TABLE 1
STUDY SAMPLE STATISTICS (N  102)
% %
% Upper % Some
Poor/ % Middle H.S. college % %
% Low Middle Class & % % % or or Post Born
Female income Class Wealthy 19–29 30–49 50 less BS/BA Grad. US*
45 18 62 20 30 56 14 14 43 42 29
*Includes for sociological reasons persons who migrated to the US before age 10.
sample demography) were asked: “There have been discussions about
whether Arabs are white or not, with different points of view, do you think
Arabs are white, not white, or what?” Sixty-three percent of respondents
said Arabs were not white; twenty percent said they were white, while an-
other seventeen percent gave equivocal responses. Study data indicate the
elements of social life that persons bring to bear in their assessment of the
“racial place” of Arabs, which could be phenotypical, experiential, obser-
vational, relational, local, national, or global. These data also point to the
complexity of understanding Arab American ideas about race and the need
to supplement questions about race using standardized, official categories
with questions that take into account the meanings of these terms.
Individuals who said Arabs were not white made this assessment on the
basis of, in order of frequency: their treatment in American society; skin
color and other phenotypic criteria; the fact that Arabs are multiracial and
possess cultural/historical differences from white Europeans; and Arab
distinctiveness (“Arabs are Arabs”). Many invoked multiple criteria. A
majority of persons who said Arabs are white and about one-third of per-
sons who said Arabs were not white moved immediately into an unpro-
voked discourse on information and application forms (especially census
forms and job and school applications). In other words, the discussion of
race became a discussion of boxes, how they respond to these boxes, and
the way American society boxes people into groups by color. Arabs know
well that they are supposed to check the white box on forms, and a ma-
jority say they do so, whether they believe Arabs are white or not and even
when they have serious problems with the concept. (Arabs who check
“other” and write-in “Arab” or an Arab nationality, or who can be identi-
fied as Arabs by language, country of birth, or ancestry, are re-coded by
the Census Bureau as white.)68
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Q: There have been discussions about whether Arabs are white
or not, with different points of view, do you think Arabs are
white, not white, or what?
A: This confuses me every time I fill out an application. We are
not White, Black, Hispanic, or Asian. We are Arab. I put white.
If there is an other, sometimes I put that. But I put White be-
cause I know we are not other (Jordan-born female).
Still, some insist on checking the “other” box. This man responded to the
question about race as follows:
I always choose “other.” I’m not white and I’m not going to check
white (Puerto Rican-born male).
A large segment of persons who said Arabs were white said they knew this
because it is what they were told.
I was really surprised when I learned that we were Caucasian
(US-born woman).
Geographically, Egypt is in Africa but they classify all the Arabs
as white, so I write white (Egyptian-born male).
But most make a distinction between what they write on forms and what
they see as their reality.
We used to report quarterly on affirmative action and I always
asked my boss, “what should I do? Should I put myself as a mi-
nority or not?” He did not know either, so we called the company
headquarters and they said you will be considered white. But of
course in real life we are not. As far as statistics go, that’s what
they say, legally (Palestinian-born male).
That’s one of the things I am thinking about as a student trans-
ferring colleges. They have a race question and I have to check
white. We are white in this case but in all other cases we are a
minority (Palestinian-born male).
Having to check the white box on forms is another form of discrimina-
tion to some.
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I am resentful that I have to put down white. I don’t look white. I
am not treated as white (1.5 female).
I don’t feel that I am white. I felt I was at a disadvantage to have
to check “white.” I don’t think it’s fair because it is not who I am.
I just don’t feel that I’m a typical white American, you know,
Anglo-Saxon, because if you look at me I’m not. I feel that I am
a minority. Why should I be grouped with these people and not
have a chance to obtain a scholarship? (Libyan-born woman).
Sometimes you put other but what is other? Other could be any-
thing. You feel like inferior, you know. Like the minority of the
minorities. We’re not defined. . . . Officially we are white but
we’re not white. Somebody can say I don’t have to hire you be-
cause you are white and I have a lot of white people here. But
you’re not white! (Palestinian-born male).
Arabs Are Not White: Responses Based 
on How They Are Treated in American Society
The largest response category among persons who said Arabs are not
white (36%) revolved around how Arabs are treated in American society.69
In other words, their saw their racial place as non-white because they do
not benefit from the statuses, assumptions, and behaviors that accord to
whiteness. The overwhelming majority of persons who gave this type of
response were born in the United States, suggesting that deep under-
standing of the relationship between race and inequality of experience
are particularly American, formed as part of an American upbringing.
These responses, in that they invoke issues that existed before 9/11, sup-
port the assertion that racial projects to exclude Arabs from the benefits
of whiteness were in place before 9/11.
I call the people I work with white and they ask, “what are you?”
What color are we? I don’t feel as a white person. People think I
must be foreign. People ask me “where are your parents from?”
(Chicago-born male).
We have always been told we should be classified as other, then
white. But if I go to Mississippi with my brother named Ahmed,
there is no way he’d be treated as white (Chicago-born female).
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Arabs are definitely not white. That categorization comes from
the treatment of a community by the institutions of American
society. Arabs in the schools face the same institutional racism
as [do] other students of color (Chicago-born male).
You understand that there is racism even if it is not personally in-
flicted on you. Being a first-generation Egyptian American and
Muslim is a difficult thing–to form an identity of your own and
feel like an American and that you fit into this country when you
feel you really don’t anyway. So, there’s always been this sort of
racism. . . . [T]hat outlook was always there, it was just exagger-
ated [after 9/11], making you feel like the enemy. That you’re the
bad one, and you’re definitely a foreigner and do not belong in this
country. I’m just as much American as anyone else. I feel like
maybe I need to get the hell out of this country because something
bad is going to happen to our people here (U.S.-born female).
The issue is are you part of a privileged group of people that can
dominate others, and I do not think we are part of that. Arabs are
not part of the white or European ruling structure. We are politi-
cally excluded (U.S.-born female).
Arabs are not white. When I view someone as white they are part
of the majority culture. I don’t get treated as white, so I am not
white. I never check white (U.S.-born male).
Arabs Are Not White: Responses Based 
on Skin Color and Other Phenotypic Criteria
The second most common response (28%) among persons who said Arabs
are not white was about skin color and phenotypic features. These re-
sponses were found among both U.S.- and non-U.S.-born respondents, al-
though immigrants frequently spoke of how they only learned about ideas
and systems organized around skin color after arriving in the United
States.
I’m not white, I’m olive. To certain people it matters if you’re
white (Chicago-born female).
We don’t look white. What matters in the U.S. is not Caucasian
blood but skin color. This has a huge impact on us. And you see
nappy hair, even if blue eyes and light skin (Chicago-born female).
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In this suburb, it is lilly white. We don’t belong here. I am very
aware of my skin color and looks (Kuwait-born female).
I am from a country that is not white, for sure (Sudan-born male).
You know it’s funny, nobody ever discusses color once you step
out of the United States. I think it only matters in this country.
This country is very race-conscious, color-conscious I mean. My
sister married a very dark man and when you look at him you
would say he is Black. We never thought that was unusual. . . . I
complained about my hair once at school and they said oh, yeh,
you have that Semitic hair. I never thought of my hair being Se-
mitic. Sometimes the girls would say to me, “well you are olive
skinned.” I don’t see myself that way. So, I think in their minds
they have a perception of gradations of color, and I don’t have that
(Jordan-born female).
Many respondents were extremely uncomfortable with the very concept of
race and color. For a variety of reasons they found it useless, irrelevant,
or offensive.
I don’t feel comfortable classifying people by color anyway. It is
against my ideology, my thinking, and my religion (Egypt-born male).
We are definitely not white. But the whole idea of color makes
no sense to me. My neighbor is black according to census forms
but she is lighter than I am. There are Arabs that are lighter than
white people. I don’t think people should be classified like that, by
color. I don’t agree with it at all. If I was to classify myself, I
would consider myself brown. I would not consider myself white.
My youngest and oldest child would be white and my middle
child brown. It does not work for me (Kuwait-born female).
We do not talk about this issue in our community. We feel that we
are Muslims and that is what matters to us (Palestine-born male).
Arabs Are Not White: They Span a Range 
of Geographic Regions and Skin Colors
The third most common response (24%) among persons who said Arabs
are not white was that Arabs cannot be a racial group because they en-
compass many geographic regions and skin colors.
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I think Arabs should have a different category until things change.
. . . If you look on the map, Arab countries cover two continents
and the white white and dark black. If this is my cousin and he’s
dark, and he’s from Africa, are you going to call him white? (U.S.-
born female).
It does not matter to me because in the Arab community we have
white, black, and yellow. As Muslims, there is no difference be-
tween colors (Palestine-born male).
Arabs are distinct upon themselves. And the Arab world encom-
passes both black and white (U.S.-born female).
Arabs are a race of colors, many colors. In my family some have
blond hair and blue eyes. Some have brown curly hair. All colors
(Lebanon-born male).
Arabs Are Not White: Arab Heritage Is 
Different from Caucasian/European
The fourth most common response (20 percent) among persons who said
Arabs are not white was about culture and heritage. To them, being white
means being Caucasian and European, and Arabs are neither.
Their history and culture is [sic] quite separate from Europe’s. I
find it a disgrace that the Arab people should be so blatantly in-
sulted by the disregard of their history (U.S.-born female).
I do not think Arabs are white in the sense of Caucasian or white
American (U.S.-born female).
White in my mind means European but since I am not European, I
feel like I am lying. Why should I write white? (Egyptian-born male).
Most Arabs think Caucasians are Europeans (Kuwaiti-born male).
I have a culture and heritage, being white denies that (U.S.-born
male).
The following comments from a young man living in a middle class Chicago
suburb show how Arab is counterposed to Caucasian/white/American:
I was with a group of friends. These Americans, Caucasians, drove
past us and yelled out remarks—racial remarks. They turned
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around and they ran at us and we started to fight. In Chicago
Ridge everyone was Arabic mostly; our whole neighborhood was
Arabic . . . white person or American would say something about
us unless it was in school, but in Orland, it’s a little different. Ara-
bic are like, they are not the minorities over there (in Orland Park)
(U.S.-born male).
Seventeen percent of respondents gave what may be called equivocal
responses to the race question, marking the difficulty they have with the
racializing of Arabs as well as the flexible character of the race construct.
Along with expressing this ambiguity, the following quote reveals (along
with some above) the socially-constructed nature of the way Arabs re-
spond to the formulaic race question and the way it is interpreted through
transmitted knowledge.
I don’t really know. I think, for me, it’s always been white because
of what I look like. I consider myself white. That’s probably a per-
sonal reflection because my skin color is white. I’ve always
thought all Arabs were white. I’ve never really thought of them as
being non-white. But, again, why do we say we’re white, because
we’re not white. Like people say, “you put white,” and I think that
it just doesn’t make sense. I don’t know what white means in terms
of technical definition. Is it people who live north of the equator?
I don’t know how the experts have defined it. If you ask anybody,
they say to put white as a race. Do I think we’re white? I don’t
think so (Chicago-born female).
THINKING ABOUT THE BOX
Even though the race question used in the study was not formulated as a
discussion of forms and categories, responses nearly always invoked them
at some point, signaling both a learned relationship between racial iden-
tification and state categories and a deep tension between the Arab expe-
rience in the United States and the phenomenon of racial categorization.
Nonetheless, when asked whether racial identification matters, thirty per-
cent of persons interviewed said racial position is important in American
society, whether they like the concept or not, because it determines bene-
fits. As neither white nor non-white, Arabs accrue neither the benefits of
whiteness nor the protections of minority status. They feel this exclusion
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is unfair and further indicates their subordinate status. While quite a few
respondents said Arabs should have their own category, like Hispanics,
since they do not fit into any existing categories, many think the whole dis-
cussion is absurd but for the fact that American institutions work on these
premises.
Hmm. Does it matter? It might matter, actually, I’m not really
sure. I guess if you’re looking theoretical, it shouldn’t matter, but
when you look on social and political and all that stuff, I think it
does matter because of the way institutions in our society run. If
you have affirmative action at your university and you’re African
American, there are rights of having a qualified percentage. We
probably wish it doesn’t matter, but it does. On resume applica-
tions, they look at what your application says. I think it would be
foolish to think that they don’t look at what your race is (Chicago-
born female).
The formation of Arabs as a unique racial group (distinct from white)
was a socio-political process with timing and purpose different from his-
toric American racism, leaving many Arabs in the position of having no
racial category (box) that makes sense. Arabs were in the midst of the
process that rendered them non-white after the categories of race—White,
Black, Hispanic, Asian and Pacific Islander, and Native American—had
been set. Arab claims-making over the past few decades for a special cat-
egory has been declined by the Census Bureau. Although largely rejecting
the concept of the racial box, Arabs know that in a racially constructed so-
ciety thinking inside the box matters.
At the same time, Arab Americans may have racial options that mem-
bers of other groups do not possess.70 When asked, many decide from
one context to the next whether they are white or not and whether they will
select the box they have been told to select, or think about color and treat-
ment. Their own racial identity may change over their lifetime, based on
their experiences, preferences, and demands. Local contexts and orga-
nized affiliations may affect Arab American understandings about their
racial place.71 Racial identity is an unfolding, ongoing, contextual, and so-
cially constructed process for Arab Americans. As the data in our Chicago
study suggest, when Arabs select the white box it does not necessarily
mean that they identify with whiteness. But when they check other, they
know that they have become lost, paradoxically hidden yet the object of
social obsession. (They probably do not know that they will be recoded
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as white if they can be identified as Arab.) These options do not alter their
grounded reality as a negatively stigmatized group. On the contrary, they
offer proof of their racially subordinate status. Thus, the majority of Arab
Muslims in the metropolitan Chicago study view their social position in
American society as subordinate and translate that status to a non-white
racial position in a race-based societal hierarchy. Unfortunately, one can-
not conclude from these data if religious affiliation plays any role in this
finding since Arab Christians were not part of the study.72 It is notable,
however, that religion and religious discrimination were rarely invoked
in responses to this question, except in statements that Islam does not con-
done racial distinctions.
DISCRIMINATION AND SAFETY IN THE 
POST 9/11 ARAB-MUSLIM EXPERIENCE73
Prejudice, discrimination, and a compromised sense of safety are histori-
cally correlated with racial subordination in the United States. These
experiences have ranged from lynching, mass removals, quarantining, law
enforcement profiling, and sentencing disparities to inferior employment,
housing, and educational opportunities. Study participants were asked if
they had experienced discrimination since 9/11. Fifty-three percent said
yes and forty-seven percent said no. Among those who responded “yes,”
specific instances of discrimination were reported in the following social
sectors: employment (39%), public space (22%), schools (11%), law en-
forcement (11%), commercial transactions (9%), government offices (9%),
airports/airplanes (7%), and civil society institutions (6%). These responses
are related to a specific interpretation of the meaning of the term discrimi-
nation, which is to be denied something or treated in a different way than
others. Many respondents did not interpret hate speech or being watched
while conducting routine activities, such as loading their trunks, as dis-
crimination. The same applies to feeling unsafe or fearing removal from the
United States, which came up in many interviews in the context of other
questions.
Some respondents changed their daily life patterns to avoid placing
themselves in situations in which they expected to experience discrimi-
nation. Quite a few interviewees spoke of eating separately and changing
job positions, friendship groups, or their names as means of avoiding ver-
bal harassment or abuse. Many persons who used to travel domestically
have altered their travel patterns after the attacks; they either stopped trav-
eling or drove to their destinations. These actions indicate that the policing
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and control of members of the group has moved inside the mind of the
individual, what Hatem Bazian and Nadine Naber call “virtual policing.”
The overwhelming majority of our interviewees reported being verbally
insulted, although these events took different forms depending upon the
context in which they occurred. Insults were reported in public spaces, in
the schools, in the context of commercial transactions, and in shopping
malls. Many reported negative comments at work or in the process of ap-
plying for jobs. Some reported attacks on their homes, and a number of
women were spit upon. “Go back to your country” was the most frequent
slogan in public attacks, followed by “we want to kill you.” Comments
about Arab terrorists were common in work-related slurs.
Despite the fact that many interviewees said they had not experienced
discrimination, the overwhelming majority said that there are places in
American society in which they do not feel safe. Feelings of lack of safety
in public spaces appear to be gendered, as women, especially muhajibaat
(veiled women), express this feeling more than men. Suburban shopping
centers and malls were mentioned frequently as places where women en-
dured stares and insults. Feeling unsafe is not limited to the public sphere.
The government’s use of secret evidence, closed hearings, interrogations,
and home invasions appears discriminatory to members of Arab and Mus-
lim communities. Consequently, many of them feel vulnerable to a certain
degree, even in their own homes. Thus, while some persons in the study
said they felt safest in their homes, others said they felt the hidden eyes
of surveillance, assumed their phones were tapped and computers moni-
tored, and were concerned about the right of government agents to enter
their homes at any time without having permission or leaving a trace. Such
matters of collective safety and security historically are tied to racial sub-
ordination in American society. The circle of closure that Arabs and Mus-
lims feel is not physically tangible, but many fear it could become so if an-
other attack occurs. Most persons interviewed for this study report that
they do not feel secure in the United States, and many expressed fears of
mass deportation, revocation of citizenship, or internment camps.74 Those
with resources have adopted strategies to anticipate these potential out-
comes: they have sent their children to universities in other countries and
begun building homes in their countries of origin.
This feeling of “homeland insecurity” is exacerbated by the post 9/11
increase in discourses about civilizational differences between Arabs/
Muslims and persons holding Western values. These ideas are broadcast
and published in mainstream American media, particularly by neoconser-
vatives and Christian-right spokespersons, and are used to justify a range
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of government actions. Some of these spokespersons have described Islam
as a religion outside the pale of human values and Muslims as “worse than
Nazis.”75 A booklet entitled Why Islam is a Threat to America and The
West argues that Muslims are a fifth column in the United States and
“should be encouraged to leave” the country.76 Televangelist Pat Robert-
son called Muslims potential killers on his 700 Club program.77 While in
office, former Attorney General Ashcroft stated in an interview with syn-
dicated columnist Cal Thomas, “Islam is a religion in which God requires
you to send your son to die for him. Christianity is a faith in which God
sends his son to die for you.”78 Indeed, Arabs and Muslims feel quite un-
easy about the close alliance between the Bush Administration and the
Christian Right.
CONCLUSION
The racial formation processes experienced by Arab Americans differ in
both historical timing and pretext from that of other groups in the United
States. Unlike the historical argument of racial superiority and inferiority
used to buttress the development of the United States as a country of white
privilege, the fall of Arabs from the grace of marginal whiteness is trace-
able to the later emergence of the United States as a global superpower.
The seemingly race-neutral lens of essentialized cultural differences and
innate violence was promoted in the media and left to percolate by the
educational system, thereby building support for government policies that
targeted Arab Americans, justifying their political exclusion. This ap-
proach was effective and powerful because, while it buttressed U.S. global
policies, it did not appear blatantly racist.
Racial projects that moved Arabs into subordinate status began to clearly
mark the Arab American experience in the late 1960s and provided mo-
mentum for the foundation of pan-Arab American activist organizations. In
the 1990s, when Islamist challenges to American global hegemony became
more powerful than Arab nationalism, these essentialized constructions
were extended to Muslims and became grander; they became civilizational:
Both Arabs and Muslims were represented as persons of inherently differ-
ent values and dispositions than “Americans.” These constructions became
racialized since race is a key category for organizing difference in the
United States and is something Americans know and understand. It is an in-
terpretive construct with great power in American society and one that
newcomers quickly learn. Like others, Arabs are informed as to what their
official racial group is, but, unlike others, many Arabs find a disjuncture
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between their category (white) and their experiences, since race is under-
stood as a phenomenon with experiential correlates.
For decades, Arabs in the United States have faced challenges from the
public over their beliefs, values, opinions, and culture. Their protests over
negative representations have been silenced by their powerlessness, an out-
come of their blocked participation in the institutions of civil society. The
corporealization of the essentialized Arab/Muslim, embodied in images of
dark haired, olive-skinned, and hook-nosed persons, came to life as “Arabs,
Muslims, and persons assumed to be Arabs and Muslims” faced wide-
spread attack after 9/11. Notions of collective, civilizational responsibility
justified imputing to Arabs and Muslims a collective guilt for the attacks.
As persons purportedly of a different civilization, Arabs/Muslims were
counterposed to Americans and to whites—they were suspected, unsafe,
and virtually circled.
The most noted features of Arab exclusion have been persistent, nega-
tive media representations, denial of political voice, governmental and
non-governmental policies that target their activism, and civilizational dis-
tortions of Arab and Muslim values and ways of life. Since the darkening
of Arabs began in earnest after the beneficiaries of the U.S. civil rights
movement had been determined and the categories of “non-white” and
“minority” had been set, Arabs have experienced the double burden of
being excluded from whiteness and from mainstream recognition as peo-
ple of color. Their isolation from mainstream vehicles of dissent left them
with few powerful allies to contest their treatment in American society,
leaving them open targets for collective punishment after the 9/11 attacks
on the United States. While many Arab American activists recognized long
ago that the road to their political inclusion and an end to the discrimina-
tion was in alliances with people of color, their untouchable issues (espe-
cially, Israeli military occupation of Palestinian lands) and their domestic
economic role as urban shopkeepers placed strains on these relationships.
Perhaps one of the positive developments in the post 9/11 America is the
greater willingness of these groups to accept Arabs into their ranks.
Viewed over its one-hundred-year history, the Arab American experi-
ence is not well explained by prominent theories of immigrant integra-
tion and ethnic assimilation. The reason for this lies in a number of as-
sumptions: that race is a special case of ethnicity rather than a discredited
but still powerful social organizing tool; that the creation of racially de-
fined subordinate groups is a legacy of the American past (although the
consequences of this history endure); and that no new racial groups will be
constructed. It follows from these assumptions that no new group will
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experience downward movement on the color line, because in post-civil
rights American society racial projects asserting the essential human dif-
ference of certain groups are no longer acceptable. Those days are over.
Research should therefore focus on whether the color lines are blurring,
whether some groups are permeating the old boundaries of race as evi-
denced by upward mobility, and whether some groups continue to face
racially-based subordination.
I have shown that racializing processes are not just legacies of the
American past, that racist ideas composed of social constructions of es-
sential human differences can be effectively hidden behind new dis-
courses, and that government policies may even promote these ideas. The
fact that such policies are rooted in global matters instead of the domestic
distribution of power and resources does not alter the fact that they produce
domestic inequality, civic and political exclusion, pedagogical stereotyp-
ing, and that they incite hate crimes, prejudice, and discrimination. Arab
American experiences with these social phenomena affect how they see
their place in the American racial order. Many Arab Americans have been
critical of American democracy because of their very real experiences of
political exclusion with regard to challenging U.S. foreign policies, civic
exclusion because their issues are portrayed as “divisive,” and the use of
stereotypes and hostile images to support government policies. These as-
pects of the American political system are well known in the Arab world,
affecting—in the views of many Arabs—the sincerity of American efforts
to install democracy around the world.
The one-hundred-year history of Arab American communities provides
clarity to this analysis, since one can compare their experiences before and
after negative racialization. Arab Americans were at one time considered
white, although this status was contested in some locations, and they
largely benefited from marginal whiteness during the first decades of their
American experience. After they were constructed as a group at odds with
American values, as inherently violent and oppressive, they lost privileges
in many American social and political realms. The spread of Islamic re-
vivalism to the United States offered resources to dispirited Arab American
Muslims: hope, a way of life based on a belief in God, and social rela-
tionships that offered dignity, inspiration, and strength.79 The capacity of
religion to provide “refuge, respectability, and resources” is well recog-
nized.80 Unfortunately, as the Islamic revival spread across the country, so,
too, were ideas about Arab barbarism extended to Muslims and evolved
into a discourse of inherent civilizational differences. As the paradigm and
phenotype were extended to Muslims, Arab and Muslim were conflated,
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making it is necessary to speak about them in one construct: the Arab/
Muslim/Middle Easterner. This consolidation will move Arab and Muslim
Americans into a new trajectory that may begin to transform dominant
discourses, because Muslims as a religious group may be more success-
ful making claims on American institutions than racially subordinated
Arabs, a pattern borne out in the history of race and religion in the United
States.
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